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An Assessment of the Chapter 19 Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism in the Context of the 
NAFTA Renegotiation 
GABRIEL CAVAZOS VILLANUEVA† 
PAOLA MONZÓN CADENA‡* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most salient characteristics of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)1 is its dispute settlement framework. In 
contrast with many other trade agreements, NAFTA in fact contains a 
different dispute resolution structure for virtually every kind of trade 
and investment conflict.2 Probably the most singular mechanism is the 
Chapter 19 system to resolve antidumping and countervailing duty 
(“AD/CVD”) disputes between NAFTA Parties.  
On July 17, 2017, the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) released the “Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA 
Renegotiation,”3 which contends inter alia that since NAFTA came 
into force “…trade deficits have exploded, thousands of factories have 
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 1.  North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 19 U.S.C. 
21, 32 I.LM. 289 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994). 
 2.  Stephen J. Powell, Expanding the NAFTA Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement System: A 
Way to Declaw Trade Remedy Laws in a Free Trade Area of the Americas?, 16 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 217, 219 (2010).  
 3.  Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (July 17, 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf. 
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closed, and millions of Americans have found themselves stranded, no 
longer able to utilize the skills for which they had been trained. For 
years, politicians promising to renegotiate the deal gave American 
workers hope that they would stop the bleeding. But none followed 
up.”4 This assertion is in accordance with the promise made by 
President Donald J. Trump when he was a candidate: renegotiate 
NAFTA or take the U.S. out of the Agreement.5 The USTR document’s 
chapter on Trade Remedies, in its summary of specific objectives for 
the NAFTA renegotiation, establishes as an objective: “Eliminate the 
Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism.”6 Although for many years 
politicians, the business sector and commentators have criticized 
Chapter 19 in the U.S.,7 the statements that have followed the 
objectives of the NAFTA renegotiation, at least from the U.S. position, 
focus on the assertion that the U.S. has been the big “loser” in the 
AD/CVD disputes.8  
In this context, the purpose of this article is to determine whether 
it is possible or not to find “winners” or “losers” in the NAFTA 
Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism by providing an empirical 
analysis of the outcomes of Chapter 19 binational panel reviews. 
Moreover, in the context of the NAFTA renegotiation, this paper 
briefly analyzes some alternative scenarios considering the possibility 
of Chapter 19 being eliminated from the agreement, or substantially or 
partially amended. Thus, the first section describes the origins and 
main characteristics of the mechanism, as well as its most commonly 
perceived flaws and advantages. A second section analyzes how 
binational panels have rendered their decisions, considering factors 
such as the sectors or products involved in the controversy, the 
participating Parties, and the number of decisions that have been 
remanded to the investigating authority. Finally, this paper briefly 
analyzes the role of Chapter 19 in the NAFTA renegotiation and some 
possible scenarios for the future of the North American AD/CVD 
dispute settlement regime. 
 
 4.  Id. at 2. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 14.  
 7.  See Daniel N. Adams, Back to Basics: The Predestined Failure of NAFTA Chapter 
19 and Its Lessons for the Design of International Trade Regimes, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
205, 243 (2008). 
8. See USTR Releases NAFTA Negotiating Objectives, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (July 17, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/july/ustr-releases-nafta-negotiating.  
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II. NAFTA CHAPTER 19: ITS ORIGINS AND MAIN CHARACTERISTICS 
When Canada and the United States started the negotiations that 
ultimately produced the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”), 
Canada proposed the elimination of AD/CVD enforcement of 
transactions occurring within the free trade area.9 For the U.S. 
negotiators, this proposal was unacceptable. The alternative was the 
creation of an innovative and sui generis dispute settlement 
mechanism.10 The creation of the Binational Panel review process was 
envisioned as a temporary measure until the Parties11 reached a more 
permanent solution to the problem of the so-called unfair trade 
practices,12 by means of a working group specifically conceived for 
such purpose. In this context, a mechanism designed to be temporary 
which had been working relatively smoothly and without undue 
controversy in the FTA context, and was extended to NAFTA with the 
inclusion of Mexico.13 
When the FTA came into force, there were important arguments 
that supported the Binational Panels mechanism: Canada was 
unwilling to abide by what it perceived to be a biased and arbitrary 
administration of the US trade remedy laws. The US, on the other hand, 
refused to exempt Canada from the administration of those laws.14 This 
is the most important rationale to explain one of the most singular 
characteristics of the Chapter 19 mechanism: Binational Panels apply 
domestic law.  
In this context, “…Chapter 19’s binational panel review became 
the ‘eleventh hour’ stop-gap measure of compromise.”15 A system 
 
 9.  Richard O. Cunningham, NAFTA Chapter 19: How Well Does It Work—How Much 
Is Needed, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 79, 80 (2000) (arguing that these negotiations led to the 
development of a truly viable mechanism for dispute settlement).  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  For purposes of the treaties discussed in this Article, the term “Parties” refers to the 
signing parties of the treaty referenced. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 101.  
 12.  Gabriel Cavazos Villanueva & Luis F. Martínez Serna, Private Parties in the NAFTA 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Mexican Experience, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (2002) 
(citing Sergio López Ayllón & Héctor Fix-Fierro, Communication Between Legal Cultures: 
The Case of NAFTA’s Chapter 19 Binational Panels, in THE EVOLUTION OF FREE TRADE IN 
THE AMERICAS: L’ÉVOLUTION DU LIBRE-ÉCHANGE DANS LES AMÉRIQUES (Louis Perret & Judy 
Korecky eds., Wilson & Lafleur 1999). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Gabriel Cavazos Villanueva, Binational Panels of Arbitration: Impartial Adjudicators 
or Spawning Ground of New Ideas?: The Mexican Experience Under the Mechanism for 
Dispute Resolution of Chapter 19 of the NAFTA (1997) (LL. M. thesis, University of Toronto) 
(available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ29454.pdf). 
 15.  Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing Off the Third Branch: Precluding Judicial Review of Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duty Assessments under Free Trade Agreements, 19 MD. J. 
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intended to last only for a few years, until the Parties negotiated a 
substantive regime to replace the domestic AD/CVD laws, thus 
became permanent.16 
The binational panel review mechanism has several sui generis 
characteristics not found in any other system to resolve trade 
controversies:17  
a. The review is conducted by a Panel established ad 
hoc, i.e., it is not a standing supranational court but a 
group of five specialists in international trade from the 
Parties involved in the particular dispute (two from one 
Party and three from the other). In that sense, the system 
differs from third party arbitration. 
 
b. The Panels substitute for domestic judicial review of 
the final AD/CVD determinations made by the 
competent investigative authority of the importing 
Party.   
 
c. NAFTA Chapter 19 does not establish a substantive 
body of AD/CVD law; rather the Panels must apply the 
unfair trade law of the Party that rendered the 
determination. In this context, the Binational Panels are 
international adjudicatory bodies of domestic law that 
apply “the importing Party’s antidumping or 
countervailing duty law to the facts of a specific case.”   
 
d. The Binational Panels apply a specific domestic 
standard of judicial review. They can also apply, in 
addition to the domestic AD/CVD law, relevant 
statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative 
practice and judicial precedents of the importing Party.  
 
e. The procedure involves the participation of private 
parties, in contrast to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of NAFTA Chapter 20 or the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding of the WTO, which only 
allow the participation of governments. Any person 
who would otherwise be entitled under the law of the 
 
INT’L L. & TRADE 175, 179 (1995); see also Villanueva, supra note 14, at 61–62. 
 16.  Villanueva & Serna, supra note 12, at 1019. 
 17.  Id. 
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importing Party to commence domestic procedures for 
judicial review of a final determination of the importing 
Party’s authority, can request a Panel review through 
the respective complainant’s government.   
 
f. A Panel resolution does not provide a relief by itself; 
it may only uphold or remand an administrative 
authority’s determination. In the case of a remand, the 
Investigating Authority shall render a new 
determination in accordance with a Panel’s opinion. 
The Panels’ decisions are binding on the involved 
parties with respect to the particular matter. However, 
their decisions do not give life to any sort of precedent, 
and their effects are not erga omnes, but only inter 
partes, and do not bind other Binational Panels or the 
domestic courts of the Parties. [This is relevant because 
some commentators have argued that Panels might be 
creators of a separate body of jurisprudence.18]  
 
g. A Panel’s decision is not appealable to a domestic 
court. The only recourse is an Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee (“ECC”), which may be established either 
in cases where a Party argues that a Panel did not apply 
the appropriate standard of review or in cases of gross 
misconduct of a panelist.19  
The use of ECC has been limited to some very controversial 
cases, however the challenges have not been successful.20  
Some of these characteristics reflect many of the perceived 
advantages of the system. One of them, is that private parties have 
direct access to the mechanism, as opposed to what happens in other 
dispute settlement mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).21 Panels also have demonstrated an advantage over 
domestic courts in terms of the expertise of the panelists and the 
impartiality of the process.22 Also, the majority of the panel decisions 
have been unanimous and in those decisions taken by the majority of 
the panel, there has not been evidence of split along the nationalities 
 
 18.  Cf. Powell, supra note 2, at 228. 
 19.  Villanueva & Serna, supra note 12, at 1019–1021 (internal citations omitted).  
 20.  Cf. Powell, supra note 2, at 237–38. 
 21.  See generally Villanueva & Serna, supra note 12 (arguing in general that one of the 
most salient advantages of the mechanism is the possibility of private parties’ participation).  
 22.  Adams, supra note 7, at 233.  
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of the panelists.23 Moreover, more claims have been filed under 
Chapter 19 than under any other NAFTA dispute settlement 
mechanism.24 
Perhaps the most salient shortcoming of the system has been its 
complete failure to resolve the infamous Softwood Lumber disputes 
between the US and Canada. Particularly because on three separate 
occasions, Panels found for the Canadian position. Although these 
rulings were a clear win for Canada, the US did not want to comply 
with them and both countries reached an alternative settlement by 
means of an agreement.25 Of course, the fact that the US didn’t obey 
the decisions seriously threatens the legitimacy of the system, and it 
can be a good argument for those in favor of the elimination of the 
mechanism from NAFTA. 
Stephen Powell has concluded that another major flaw of the 
mechanism is that, at least in the cases involving US determinations, 
Panels have applied a standard of review, that is clearly different than 
the one applied by the US domestic courts. He considers that Panels 
often examine the evidence anew, rather than reviewing the propriety 
of the agency or lower court findings and conclusions26   
An interesting observation concerning the Panels reviewing 
Mexican determinations, is that WTO law (especially the Antidumping 
Agreement) is regularly applied as “Mexican law,” because many of 
the arguments raised by the participants are based on the relevant 
agreements. This is certainly not a defect of the system, but an outcome 
certainly unexpected when NAFTA came into force.27 
Another shortcoming that can be relevant for the NAFTA 
renegotiation process is the inability to appeal panel decisions, even 
when it was considered an advantage when the treaty was drafted.28 
The lack of opportunity to correct possible errors of law is also 
reflected in cases where there have been multiple remands, and 
sometimes agency resistance and even open hostility toward the panel 
decisions.29 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 206.  
 26.  Powell, supra note 2, at 228–29.  
 27.  This is a personal observation of the authors derived from their participation in the 
binational panel reviews.  
 28.  Powell, supra note 2, at 226–27.  
 29.  Adams, supra note 7, at 234.  
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Another major defect of the system is that there are 
unconscionable delays in the Panel formation, especially in cases 
involving Mexico. According to Stephen Powell, some of the delays 
are the result of the lack of available panelists in the Mexican legal 
system, but “the largest cause of the delays is one Party or the other 
taking the Chapter 19 process hostage to trade demands it makes of the 
other Party that are unrelated to the issues involved in the NAFTA 
review.”30 The delay in the appointment of the panelists in the High 
Fructose Syrup31 Panel prompted the United States to seek relief from 
a WTO Panel, before the NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel was actually 
established.32 The WTO Panel rendered a decision prior to the NAFTA 
Chapter 19 Binational Panel.33 Therefore, by the time the Chapter 19 
Panel was able to hand out its own resolution, it already had an 
interpretation of unfair trade practices made by an international 
adjudicatory body.  It is clear that a NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel renders 
its decision in accordance with the domestic AD/CVD law of the 
importing Party, which in this particular case was Mexico.34 However, 
the NAFTA Panel took into account the resolution made by the WTO 
Panel, in accordance with WTO law, and applied a principle of 
international comity to integrate the resolution of the special group into 
its own.35 These kinds of “parallel proceedings” are possible because 
Chapter 19 does not contain a forum exclusion clause. If the system is 
amended, this is an opportunity to correct the omission of such a 
clause. 
These defects can be deemed as a cause for the U.S. proposal to 
eliminate Chapter 19. Notwithstanding the above, it is not clear why 
the US Government claims that Chapter 19 has been especially 
negative for the US interests. As a matter of fact, the main purpose of 
the authors when choosing to draft this paper was to examine such 
empirical evidence, in order to confirm or disprove if Chapter 19 has 
been prejudicial for the Parties. In the following section this paper 
analyzes some data that can be relevant to reach such conclusions, 
although some of them could certainly be beyond the scope of this 
essay.  
 
 30.  Powell, supra note 2, at 227–28. 
 31.  In re Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Secretariat File No. MEX-USA-98-1904-
01 (Aug. 3, 2001), translated at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DesktopModules/NAFTA_DecisionReport/pdf.ashx?docID=5376&lang=1.  
 32.  Id. at 6. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1805.  
 35.  In re Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, supra note 31. 
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III. THE CHAPTER 19 EXPERIENCE: HOW HAVE BINATIONAL PANELS 
RULED? 
As has been described above, since the 2016 U.S. presidential 
campaign, commentators have expressed that NAFTA’s Chapter 19 
“has hindered” or “thwarted” the United States from pursuing 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases against Mexican and 
Canadian firms.36 To the contrary, the Treaty not only imposes no 
obstacle for corporations to challenge trade remedy determinations, 
but the Agreement actually allows that they do it before an impartial 
forum for their complaints. This section analyzes Binational Panel 
decisions as a way to asses those assertions in the context of panel 
review results. In other words, we should look at the facts to answer 
the question: Has the United States really been “the biggest loser” in 
the NAFTA’s Chapter 19 Binational Panel decisions? 
In order to do that, we have looked into the Binational Panel 
decisions published in the official NAFTA Secretariat website,37 which 
includes the rulings from 1995 to date. It is important to note that this 
website includes decisions of cases that are still active. Also, not every 
NAFTA Binational Panel has ended with a Final Decision, some have 
been “terminated” for several reasons (such as settlement between the 
litigants), but not by the normal course of the procedure. This analysis 
focuses only on the “completed cases” as classified by the Secretariat 
itself, i.e., not the ones that are active, suspended, or otherwise 
terminated.38 
As of October 2017, there have been 64 completed Binational 
Panel decisions. This number includes challenges to all three Parties. 
Firstly, we were interested to know which products are most subject to 
recurring controversies. The latter, to see if this has become a 
politicized mechanism, where the merchandises that are the issue of 
the disputes are strategic for the parties’ economies; as has been said 
about the WTO Dispute settlement mechanism, where it is considered 
 
 36.  David Lawder, Any Trump NAFTA Withdrawal Faces Stiff Court Challenge: Legal 
Experts, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-
trump-options/any-trump-nafta-withdrawal-faces-stiff-court-challenge-legal-experts-
idUSKBN1DL2PK; see also Reuters Staff, WTO Better for Solving U.S. Trade Spats than 
NAFTA Tool: Mexico Minister, REUTERS (July 20, 2017, 11:56 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico/wto-better-for-solving-u-s-trade-spats-
than-nafta-tool-mexico-minister-idUSKBN1A60A6?il=0. 
 37.  Decisions and Reports, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports (last visited Aug. 18, 2017).  
 38.  Status Report of Panel Proceedings, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Status-Report-of-Panel-Proceedings (last visited Aug. 
18, 2017). 
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that “interest group pressure on both sides of a trade dispute pushes 
politicized trade topics into dispute adjudication.”39 
Our findings are illustrated in the following chart, which shows 
forty three of the sixty-four completed Binational cases. This 
represents those Binational Panel cases that concern multiple reviews 
of certain goods. The remaining twenty-one cases are not shown on the 
chart, because there were only one or two reviews per product.   
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident that a relative majority of the cases (seventeen out of 
sixty-four) are related to products of the steel industry. These are not 
always the same products, ranging from steel sheets, flat coated steel 
products, tubes and rebar, among others. It reflects that all three 
countries have important steel industries40 that governments are 
 
 39.  Christina L. Davis, The Effectiveness of WTO Dispute Settlement: An Evaluation of 
Negotiation Versus Adjudication Strategies, 1, 3 (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.424.7368&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 40.  North American Steel Industry: Recent Market Developments and Key Challenges 
Going Forward, OECD STEEL COMMITTEE (May 6–7, 2010), 
https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/45144151.pdf. 
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inclined to protect, and with major players who want to defend their 
interests against an importing Party’s adverse administrative decisions.  
Also, it is noteworthy that, out of the thirty-six cases in which the 
United States has been the importing Party (see Figure 2), twenty-nine 
are amongst the products under recurring Panel review. This suggests 
that, at least in the U.S.’ final determination, there are industries in 
which the Investigating Authority tends to impose antidumping or 
countervailing duties on “sensitive” products. 
Regarding Mexico and Canada, from the authors’ analysis of the 
products that were the subject of the completed cases, it is possible to 
conclude that the products vary. In the case of Mexico, there have been 
four Chapter 19 Panel Reviews concerning steel products that have 
completed cases challenged the Mexican investigating authority; four 
concerning the chemical industry (urea, caustic soda, stearic acid, and 
ether); two of meats or livestock (pork and bovine carcasses); and 
another four of various products.41 In the case of Canada, steel has been 
the only merchandise that has been subject to panel review more than 
two times (four times).42 At least from this data, it seems difficult to 
conclude that there is a strong interest group in Mexico or Canada that 
“pushes” for the establishment of antidumping or countervailing duties 
to products from the other NAFTA Parties. Of course, it is well known 
that between the United States and Canada, subsidies on Softwood 
Lumber have been the most important trade remedy issue for many 
years.43  
On the other hand, it seems important to analyze whether there is 
a Party that mostly benefits from Chapter 19, since President Trump 
has called NAFTA “the worst trade deal maybe ever,” and many of his 
supporters agree with him.44 Also, the Mexican Secretary of Economy 
said on May 2017, that “The majority of recent controversies (with the 
United States) . . . we have won them all in the WTO, which has been 
for us, a much more efficient mechanism than Chapter 19 of NAFTA.”45 
In order to do that, we analyzed the disputes based on the Parties 
that were involved, and then studied the outcomes of the Binational 
Panel decisions. Again, the following chart illustrates the data obtained 
 
 41.  NAFTA SECRETARIAT, supra note 38. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Adams, supra note 7, at 206–09. 
 44.  David Floyd, NAFTA’s Winners and Losers, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/north-american-free-trade-
agreement.asp. 
 45.  Reuters Staff, supra note 36, at 2 (emphasis added). 
VILLANUEVA - ASSESSMENT OF THE CHAPTER 19 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  12:28 PM 
116 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:106 
from the Secretariat database:  
FIGURE 2 
 
The horizontal axis shows the importing Party (i.e., the 
investigating authority that rendered the AD/CVD determination). The 
vertical axis shows the nationality of the exporting company (or 
companies). Both Canada and Mexico have been importers on fourteen 
of the completed disputes. The United States has been the importer 
Party on thirty-six cases. That means that in over fifty percent of the 
controversies (56.25%) Canadian or Mexican companies have 
requested a Binational Panel to review a Final Determination issued by 
the United States International Trade Commission of US. 
Even though there have been more challenges against the U.S. 
Investigating Authority determinations through Chapter 19 Binational 
Panels, U.S. companies have also exercised their right to request a 
Panel review more times than the other Parties: 25% more times than 
the companies from Mexico or Canada. As shown in the chart, 
Mexican exporters have challenged other Parties’ determinations 
twenty times, Canadians have requested nineteen reviews, and the 
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United States twenty-five. 
Regarding the Parties involved in the disputes, it is evident that 
Canada and Mexico are in very similar conditions: They have 
challenged the U.S. Investigating Authority before a Binational Panel, 
and they have been challenged by U.S. and Canadian companies, 
almost the equivalent number of times.  
Figure 2 also reveals that there have only been three completed 
cases between Mexico and Canada, one where Canada was the 
importing Party against Mexican exporters, and two where Canadian 
companies challenged the Mexican Investigating Authority 
determination.  The vast majority of the controversies involve the 
United States, either as the Investigating Authority, or as the 
nationality of the exporting company. That leaves a U.S. party, either 
a company or the government agency, as a participant in sixty-one of 
the sixty-four cases. As such, it is the view of the authors that the 
abolition of Chapter 19, or the exit of the United States from NAFTA, 
would definitely change the dynamic of judicial remedies against 
dumping on North American trade.46  
It is important to point out that, naturally, the fact that a company 
requests a Panel review of an AD/CVD determination does not 
necessarily mean that the duty would be ultimately revoked, even 
when the decision of the Panel is to remand the determination. 
Nevertheless, some analysts have concluded that the United States is 
“the biggest loser” in Chapter 19 Binational Panels, because they have 
“lost” in 67% of the cases where it has been involved, which includes 
72% of the cases where the United States is the respondent party 
(twenty-six out of thirty-six cases).47 It is difficult to agree with these 
figures, for the following reasons. 
As has been established, both Canada and Mexico have been 
importers in fourteen of the completed disputes. For its part, the United 
States has been the importing Party in thirty-six cases. Not all those 
cases have ended with just one Decision of the Binational Panel. As a 
matter of fact, the majority have not. This is illustrated in the following 
 
 46.  All of the completed cases that have been reviewed regarding determinations from 
Mexican and Canadian authorities have been regarding dumping issues. Only the United States 
has issued some determinations regarding countervailing duties in opposition to subsidized 
products. NAFTA SECRETARIAT, supra note 38. 
 47.  Alfredo Carrillo & Sergio Lozano, Sale EU Perdedor con Capítulo 19 (The U.S. Has 
Lost with Chapter 19), AGENCIA REFORMA (Aug. 16, 2017), 
http://www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/articulo/default.aspx?id=1186594&md5=cf284d1
c950c3f65b1d5d22dc4369bf3&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b2efe.  
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chart:  
FIGURE 3: FIRST DECISIONS OF COMPLETED BINATIONAL PANEL 
REVIEWS 
Importing 
Party 
Upheld 
Partially 
Remanded 
Remanded Terminated Total 
CDA 9 4 1 0 14 
MEX 3 6 3 2 14 
USA 8 27 1 0 36 
Total 20 37 5 2 64 
 
This graphic shows the ruling of all Binational Panels  in every 
completed case on the first decision that they issued. As can be seen 
from this chart, the vast majority of the completed cases were not 
upheld in the first decision. Actually, more than half of the panel 
decisions partially remanded or remanded the Investigating 
Authority’s determination. It is also possible to realize that both 
Mexican and American determinations under review were remanded 
more times that they were upheld, which shows that the system is not 
biased against one of the Parties.  
Figure 3 demonstrates that it is uncommon for a panel to affirm 
the determination on its first decision. Often, there are multiple 
determinations on remand issued in a single case. This does not mean 
that any of the Parties “lost,” as has been stated by some analysts.48 
There was even a review in which the Panel partially remanded the 
Investigating Authority’s determination five times, and ultimately 
affirmed it.49 
 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  In re Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2002-
1904-03 (Mar. 17, 2006) (decision of panel on fourth remand determination), available 
at http:// www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/ 1/Dispute/English/NAFTA_Chapter_ 
19/USA/ua02035e.pdf. 
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As has been stated, there is no accurate way to conclude that the 
mentioned analysis that established that the United States “lost” on 
twenty-six out of thirty-six cases where they were the importing Party 
is correct.50 Firstly, because the number “26” cannot be found on the 
graphic, but mainly because of the reasoning that follows. 
On a “partially remanded” decision, the Panel affirms some 
rulings of the Investigating Authority, and remands one or more of 
other rulings in the determination. This does not mean that the 
Investigating Authority -or the Party- “loses”; since it is entirely 
possible that in the determination on remand, the Agency keeps the 
antidumping duty, but elucidates its decision according to the law, and 
consequently the Panel affirms the determination, as happened 
recently on the Rebar review.51 The following graphic is relevant:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50.  See Carrillo & Lozano, supra note 47. 
 51.  In re Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bar, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-2014-1904-02 
(July 14, 2016), available at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DesktopModules/NAFTA_DecisionReport/pdf.ashx?docID=20741&lang=1. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
This last chart makes evident that thirty out of the forty-two cases 
where the determinations were remanded or partially remanded, were 
ultimately affirmed. Of these cases, all of the ones that reviewed a 
Canadian determination were affirmed, and twenty-one from the 
twenty-eight US determinations were affirmed.52 
By correlating the last two charts, we can see that the Binational 
Panels have issued twenty-nine affirmative decisions regarding 
American determinations. Twenty-nine out of thirty-six represent 80% 
of the decisions. With respect to Canada, the Binational Panels have 
issued affirmative decisions on 100% of the cases where the Canadian 
Investigating Authority was challenged. It is noteworthy that these 
affirmative decisions were either the first or the second decisions of 
the review, and in just one case the affirmative decision was the third 
one.53 Regarding Mexico, there is information of affirmative decisions 
 
 52.  In the case of Mexico, four out of nine were ultimately affirmed; but it is important 
to point out that, in five cases, the last decisions were not published on the Secretariat website. 
NAFTA SECRETARIAT, supra note 38. 
 53.  In re Certain Iodinated Contrast Media Imaging, Secretariat File No. CDA-USA-
2000-1904-01 (Sept. 23, 2003), available at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DesktopModules/NAFTA_DecisionReport/pdf.ashx?docID=7404&lang=1. 
Ultimately Affirmed
CDA USA MEX
21
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in only seven of the fourteen cases where the Mexican Authority was 
challenged54  
It is important to insist that it is incorrect to use the term “losing” 
regarding countries in a Chapter 19 panel review, mainly because a 
determination that is remanded can be ultimately upheld. 
From this analysis, this paper would not conclude that the United 
States has experienced any disadvantage, or bias against it, in the 
Binational Panel decisions. Moreover, the U.S.’ participation in the 
vast majority of the disputes somehow demonstrates the importance of 
Chapter 19 to American interests. 
IV. CHAPTER 19 IN THE NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 
Since July 2017, when the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative published its objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, 
Chapter 19 has become a focal point. This was mostly because, almost 
immediately, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States David 
MacNaughton stated that it is critical that NAFTA has some kind of 
antidumping and countervailing duty dispute resolution mechanism,55 
which was backed by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau a week later.56 In 
Mexico, the Senate recommended the administration to protect 
Chapter 19,57 and Ildefonso Guajardo, secretary of Economy and 
Mexican chief negotiator concurred with the Senate, stating that a 
dispute settlement mechanism should persist, although it may not 
necessarily be the same.58 
One of the main reasons that this issue became troublesome in the 
negotiations was the fact that there was no detailed proposal from the 
 
 54.  That is to say, that either the last decision of the Panel was a decision to remand, and 
the process did not continue, or that the Secretariat did not publish such decision in their 
website.  
 55.  David Ljunggren, NAFTA Dispute Resolution Mechanism Critical - Canada, 
REUTERS (July 18, 2017, 1:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-nafta-
canada/nafta-dispute-resolution-mechanism-critical-canada-idUSL1N1K916X. 
 56.  Leah Schnurr, Canada’s Trudeau: NAFTA Dispute Resolution System is Essential, 
REUTERS CANADA (July 25, 2017, 12:01 PM), 
https://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN1AA22E-OCATP. 
 57.  Leopoldo Hernández, Mé.xico debe defender el Capítulo 19 en TLCAN: Senado 
[Mexico must defend NAFTA’s Chapter 19: Senate], EL ECONOMISTA (July 26, 2017, 9:26 
PM), https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Mexico-debe-defender-el-Capitulo-19-
en-TLCAN-Senado-20170727-0157.html. 
 58.  Notimex, Coincide Guajardo con senadores sobre capítulo de controversias en 
TLCAN [Guajardo Coincides with Senators on Controversy Chapter in NAFTA], 
GRUPOFÓRMULA (July 21, 2017), 
http://www.radioformula.com.mx/notas.asp?Idn=700171&idFC=2017. 
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United States but only the plain elimination of Chapter 19.  In that 
regard, as has been stated, the Office of the USTR established in its 
objectives simply “Eliminate the Chapter 19 dispute settlement 
mechanism,” without stating why or with what they planned to 
substitute it.59 And it was not until the fifth round of negotiations on 
November 2017 that the United States finally proposed a “non-binding 
resolution system that would permit contestants to disregard panel 
decisions if those decisions were considered ‘clearly erroneous’ by the 
parties themselves.”60 
Naturally, this has not been accepted by the other two Parties, and 
it is very likely that it will never be. Canada has repeatedly stated that 
this “NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism cannot be eliminated or 
weakened and should remain independent of any single national justice 
system.”61 It has been said that Canada could leave the negotiations if 
the Parties cannot reach an agreement on an independent dispute 
resolution mechanism concerning final antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative determinations.62  
As discussed above, Canada’s position is nearly thirty years old, 
since, when drafting the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
Canada was concerned that U.S. agencies and tribunals were not 
applying even their own countervailing duty law correctly. Therefore, 
a binational panel review—putting review at least in part in the hands 
of non-nationals—was seen as an important concession to Canada.63 
As we have shown, U.S. exporters have benefitted from the 
Chapter 19 panel review, as it gives certainty against the other Parties’ 
domestic tribunals, and it is somehow considered more efficient.64 In 
that regard, they have said they are “alarmed” by the U.S. position 
since “the panels protect their interests overseas.”65 The President of 
 
 59.  Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, supra note 3, at 14.  
 60.  Brandon Smith, Updates on NAFTA Renegotiation Talks, BRAUMILLER LAW GROUP 
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=654aa3b4-9567-4c7b-
aa82-64069d156d5b. 
 61.  Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Have NAFTA Talks Reached a Breaking Point?, FORBES 
(Nov. 30, 2017, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2017/11/30/have-nafta-talks-reached-
a-breaking-point/#2612adaf276b. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  MICHAEL HART, ET AL., DECISION AT MIDNIGHT: INSIDE THE CANADA-U.S. FREE-
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 234–35 (1994). 
 64.  Powell, supra note 2, at 223 
 65.  William Mauldin & Paul Vieira, With Latest Nafta Proposals, U.S. Takes on Bigger 
Targets, Critics, FOX BUSINESS (Sep. 23, 2017), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/09/23/with-latest-nafta-proposals-u-s-takes-on-
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the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, United States’ most powerful 
business lobby, Thomas J. Donohue, has even called the 
administration’s proposed changes to NAFTA’s Chapter 19 
“unnecessary and unacceptable.”66 
Given these positions, and the findings established above, there 
are several scenarios that are worth mentioning, as well as some ideas 
that would update the dispute settlement system, based on its own 
experience. 
V. FACING THE RENEGOTIATION: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
Even though it is likely that, by the time this article is published, 
a decision will have been reached regarding the future of Chapter 19, 
we consider it important to mention the possible scenarios for the 
future of the North American antidumping and countervailing duty 
dispute settlement mechanism. The possible scenarios are: (a) the 
Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism remains exactly the same; 
(b) the renegotiated Agreement is signed without an AD/CVD dispute 
settlement mechanism; (c) Chapter 19 is updated, with some changes; 
or (d) Parties draft a completely new system. 
Certainly, the most plausible scenarios for Chapter 19 are either 
that it would be improved from the same basis, or that there would be 
a completely new system with totally different rules. Because of the 
position of the United States, and the importance that this issue has had 
in the negotiation, it is improbable that Chapter 19 remains the same. 
Moreover, the renegotiation is a good opportunity to amend some of 
the perceived shortcomings of the mechanism that have been 
mentioned in the first part of this paper.  Also, given the Canadian and 
Mexican stance in the matter, it is very unlikely that the renegotiated 
NAFTA would not comprise any AD/CVD dispute settlement 
mechanism. Correspondingly, if Chapter 19 (or even NAFTA) is 
repealed, controversies between the three countries would be heard by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  
The analysis as to whether the WTO has been a better forum for 
the United States than Chapter 19 is certainly beyond the scope of this 
article. However, keeping the WTO as the sole alternative to resolve 
 
bigger-targets-critics.html.  
 66.  Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on Nafta Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-
trump.html.  
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AD/CVD disputes between NAFTA countries seems to offer no 
benefit to the United States. Also, leaving domestic courts as a unique 
resort to challenge a U.S. determination, seems to be very unlikely, 
although some commentators tend to favor this alternative.67 Also, with 
the current Chapter 19, the standard of review is the law of the country 
where the dispute arouse, contrary to the WTO forum, where the 
relevant WTO Agreements would be the applicable law.68 In certain 
respects, the Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism “has been 
active and successful in dealing with particular kinds of disputes in the 
NAFTA area.”69 Nevertheless, as has been stated before, there are 
aspects where the system may be improved. 
“The tripartite [S]ecretariat is often seen as part of the reason for 
problems with [the system], including delays in the panel selection 
process and the panel proceedings themselves.”70 Much of the criticism 
stems from the fact that an independent trade secretariat was not 
created alongside NAFTA, similar to the secretariats established by the 
labor and environmental side agreements. In fact, an independent trade 
secretariat was originally agreed upon by the Parties to be based in 
Mexico City. It was never formally established, due primarily to 
absence of funding.71  
In the past years the lack of importance that the administrations 
have given to the tripartite Secretariat has led to a diminishment of staff 
that often reflects in delays in the panel procedures.72 As such, these 
government offices, which used to be larger, nowadays consist of only 
a couple of people. The fact that the Secretariats are understaffed and 
under-budgeted,73 leads to a series of efficiency problems: delays in 
 
 67.  See Chris Fournier, This Obscure Nafta Chapter Could Be Canada’s Deal-Breaker 
Again, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-24/this-obscure-nafta-chapter-could-be-
canada-s-deal-breaker-again. 
 68.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-
dsu.pdf. 
 69.  Donald McRae & John Siwiec, NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Success or Failure?, 
BIBLIOTECA JURIDICA VIRTUAL DEL INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS DE LA UNAM 
363, 364 (2010), https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/6/2904/21.pdf.  
 70.  Id. at 380. 
 71.  J. Ernesto Grijalva & Patrick T. Brewer, Monitoring and Managing North American 
Free Trade: The Administrative Bodies of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 2 SAN 
DIEGO: JUST. J. 1, 2 (1994). 
 72.  David A. Gantz, Dispute Settlement Under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of 
Forum Opportunities and Risk for the NAFTA Parties, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1090–
91 (1999).  
 73.  This is a personal observation of the authors derived from their participation in the 
binational panel reviews. 
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sending the case files to the panelists, delays in clearing them for 
access to confidential information, delays in the establishment of 
hearing dates, and a less-than-thorough follow-up on the status of the 
active cases. 
Also, the renegotiation may present a major opportunity to change 
the dynamic for appointing the panelists. According to the Agreement, 
within 30 days of a request for a panel, each involved Party (through 
its Secretariat) shall appoint two panelists, in consultation with the 
other Party.74 “Within 55 days of the request for a panel, the involved 
Parties shall agree on the selection of a fifth panelist.”75 Each Party has 
the right to disqualify from appointment to the panel up to four 
candidates proposed by the other Party.76 This provision, which should 
be an exception and not the general practice, has caused the 
conformation of the panel to take several months, and in some cases, 
even years.77 The latter, even when NAFTA clearly states that the five 
members shall be chosen by the 61st day of the request for a panel.78  
Lastly, another scenario could be the creation of a completely new 
dispute settlement system, with new rules regarding the conformation 
of the judicial body, the Secretariat and even the standard of review. 
There are limitless possibilities for the concept and structure of a new 
mechanism. Some options are: the establishment of a standing panel, 
whose members work fulltime and solely to review NAFTA 
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes; the restructuring of the 
Secretariat into a single entity with its own pre-established budget; the 
drafting of a new set of Rules of Procedure; or even the creation of an 
integrated North American antidumping and countervailing duty legal 
framework. This scenario is not impossible, considering that Chapter 
19 was itself an original conception. It is, however, unlikely that a new 
mechanism could be drafted from scratch given the timeline that the 
Parties have established for the negotiation, to be concluded before 
 
 74.  NAFTA, supra note 1.  
 75.  Id. at annex 1901.2(3). 
 76.  Id. at annex 1901.2(2). 
 77.  Pamela D. Velazco Herrera, Ventajas y Desventajas de los Mecanismos de Solución 
de Diferencias sobre Prácticas Comerciales Desleales Actualmente Disponibles para México: 
un Análisis Comparativo entre el Órgano de Solución de Diferencias de la Organización 
Mundial del Comercio y los Paneles Constituidos bajo el Capítulo 19 del TLCAN, ante una 
Posible Terminación del Mismo [Advantages and Disadvantages of the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms of Unfair Trade Practices Currently Available for Mexico: a Comparative 
Analysis Between the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization and the 
Panels Constituted under Chapter 19 of NAFTA, in Face of its Possible Termination], ITESM 
(2017). Unpublished paper on file with authors. 
 78.  NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 1901.2 (3). 
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Mexico’s general elections in July 2018. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms do not further the 
process of economic integration. With them, during the original 
negotiations, the NAFTA Parties did not seek the harmonization of 
social, political or legal regimes. Chapter 19 reflects this limited 
objective, which is now even more limited because of the recent 
protectionist political discourse. “[T]he system would work even better 
if it was developed as a catalyst for economic integration.”79 This is 
certainly not going to happen in the near future. Therefore, the main 
objectives of the NAFTA Parties are going to be the maintenance and 
application of their own trade remedy laws, especially in Canada and 
the United States. In this context, the only possible alternative, if 
NAFTA is going to survive, is to maintain an improved Chapter 19. 
Other more political alternatives pose even greater challenges to 
resolving the current AD/CVD disputes. The future of Chapter 19 and 
the outcome of the renegotiation process lie in the hands of the Parties’ 
principals. These decisions are going to be mostly political at the end 
of the day. 
 
 
 79.  Villanueva, supra note 14, at 146. 
